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There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy 
or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action.
1
  
  
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The entrenchment of a Bill of Rights in a supreme Constitution in South Africa means 
that constitutionalism will become central in a new emerging jurisprudence.  The 
constitutional requirement that the courts promote “the values which underlie an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality
2
 implies that the 
interpretive task will be radically different from what it was under the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty.  The duty imposed on the courts by section 39(1)(a) and 
7(1) will compel them to make value choices and to make those values explicit 
through clear and transparent articulation.
3
  
  
In the words of Bickel:   
  
Yet it remains to ask the hardest questions.  Which values…qualify as sufficiently 
important or fundamental or what have you to be vindicated by the Court against 
other values affirmed by legislative acts?  And how is the Court to evolve and apply 
them?…[H]ow are other values found and applied, and what weights are assigned 
to them when they come in conflict with competing values or interests?"
4
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1    Kent (ed) Law and Philosophy 392.  
2    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
3    Van Berk  Jurisprudence An Introduction 25.  
4    Bickel  The least dangerous branch 2 ed (1986) 55.  
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2  FACTS  
  
In Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape and others
5
, the Constitutional 
Court had to deal with religious freedom for the third time in its short history.  In brief 
the Law Society refused to register the applicant’s contract for community service, 
since he not only disclosed two previous convictions for possession of cannabis, but 
also indicated his intention to continue using it for religious purposes (he is a 
member of the Rastafari religion).  The respondents based their argument on the 
view that his convictions disqualified him to be admitted as an attorney, because he 
is not a “fit and proper person” if he intends to keep breaking the law.  The appellant 
based his appeal against this decision on the basis that his religion (Rastafarianism) 
required the use of cannabis.  The argument in the Constitutional Court was not that 
all use of cannabis be legalised, but that the relevant legislation
6
 is overbroad in that 
it does not provide for an exemption for religious use.  Narrowed down, the only 
question was whether the law is inconsistent with the Constitution [109], and whether 
such an inconsistency (or infringement) is indeed justified[111].     
  
3  CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION  
  
The interpretation of Chapter 2 of the Constitution involves the making of value 
judgments,
7
 it must occur in the light of the values which underlie the Constitution,
8
 it 
must be situated 'against the backdrop of the values of South African Society'; and it 
must be tested against 'the values we find inherent in, or worthy of pursuing in this 
society.
9
  Thus, constitutional adjudication requires a 'holistic, value-based' 
framework.
10
  This explicit intrusion of constitutional values into the adjudicative 
process signals a transition from a 'formal vision of law' to a 'substantive vision of 
law' in South Africa.  An important aspect of this transition is that judges who were 
accustomed to working with 'formal reasons' are now required to engage with 
'substantive reasons' in the form of moral and political values.
11
  A substantive 
reason is a moral , economic, political, institutional or other social consideration,
12
 
while a formal reason, in contrast, is a legally authoritative reason on which judges 
are required to base a decision and which overrides any countervailing substantive 
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reason arising at the point of application.
13
  This distinction makes clear that a 
formal reason, such as a rule, operates as a screen to insulate the decision-maker 
from consideration of all those substantive reasons, which have not been 
incorporated into the rule.
14
  All their lives, forces which [judges] do not recognise 
and cannot name, have been tugging at them – inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, 
acquired convictions; and the resultant is an outlook on life, a conception of social 
needs, a sense of 'the total push and pressure of the cosmos' which, when reasons 
are nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall.
15
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5    Prince v President, Cape Law Society and others 2001 2 SA 398 (CC).  
6    Section 4(b) of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 14 of 1992 and section 22A(10) of the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965.  
7    S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) para 22 at 639F, per Langa J.  
8    S v Williams 1995 3 SA 632 (CC) para 7 at 37, 644D, per Langa J.  
9    S v Williams supra note 7 at para 50 648C-D, per Langa J.  
10   Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1995 10 BCLR 1382 (CC) para 46 at 403H-I, per   
     Sachs J. 
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4 ASPECTS AND/OR VALUES CONSIDERED IN THE THREE DIFFERENT 
JUDGMENTS  
  
In the light of the aforesaid, it makes sense to evaluate the considerations taken into 
account by the three different judgments in reaching their conclusions in the Prince 
case.  
  
In the initial stage of my evaluation, I thought the easiest classifications to be made 
was that of the majority judgment, delivered by Chaskalson, which clearly inclined 
towards a communitarian approach, which means that the interest of the community 
plays the determining part. Individual autonomy is not universal, but culturally and 
socially construed. Individual freedom and independence are protected, and a 
neutral position is taken towards the private moral life of citizens. (Communitarism 
strongly opposes liberalism).  It is acknowledged that there is an infringement of the 
appellants right of freedom of religion, but an exemption is not justified, since it will 
be too much trouble for the state to regulate and administer such and exemption.  
Apart from that, it is argued that the prohibition serves 'a pressing social purpose' 
and it would contradict international obligations to allow such an exemption.  At this 
point the question arose how much consideration was given to values and the actual 
rights of the individual, and it is curious that the word 'values' is not used even once 
throughout the whole judgment.  Much is made of the vertical relationship, the 
difficulty of implementing a permit system and policing it, as well as the power of the 
legislature and the duty to sanction inconsistent conduct.  The question therefore 
arises whether this judgment in fact engages with substantive reasoning whatsoever, 
and whether it's possible that a legal positivistic approach wasn't followed, which is 
quite unable to find a place for 'values' within its improvised methodology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
11   Cockrell 1996 SAJHR 3.  
12  Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law:  A Comparative Study of Legal 
Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (1987).*l.5 RJ.  
13   Atiyah and Summers Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law:  A Comparative Study of Legal  
     Reasoning, Legal Theory and Legal Institutions (1987).* l.5 RJ. 
14   Cockrell 1996 SAJHR 5.  
15   Kent (ed) Law and Philosophy 394.  
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Ngcobo considers the central role of religion in the appellant's overall activities, even 
though it may strike other as "bizarre, illogical or irrational".  A he point out that "the 
protection of diversity is the hallmark of a free and open society"[49] and the word 
"values" is used no less than 9 times throughout the judgment.  He argues, on 
behalf of the minority, that the means employed to achieve the goal is unreasonable 
and does constitute an unreasonable infringement on the right of religious freedom, 
as guaranteed in the constitution. The fact is posed that the faithful are being forced 
to choose between following their religion or complying with the law. After a 
balancing of public and community interest, it is concluded that it is the duty of the 
legislature to make provisions for such exemption and the administering of it.    
  
Ngcobo, in my opinion, engages in substantive reasoning, by following a 
realist-cum-liberal-cum-africanist approach:   
  
Liberal in the sense that the individual's rights are recognised and an exemption 
proposed, but weighed up against public interest and the integrity of the law.  
  
Rules, principles and policy apply, and the purpose of the legislature is regarded 
important.   
  
Africanist in the sense that the history of the use of cannabis and origin of the 
religion as black consciousness movement seeking to overthrow colonialism and 
white oppression, is regarded, but also in the effort to permit other cultures a 
harmonious entrance into South African law.
16
 Realist in the sense that a "subjective, 
intuitive and creative" role is ascribed to the judge
17
 in applying a balancing of rights 
and values against the social background and history.  
  
Sachs, for the minority, strongly emphasises, even pleads, for tolerance towards 
multiculturalism and religious diversity, as well as a sensitivity towards marginalized, 
vulnerable and stigmatised groups.  He opposes rigid mainstream norms which "put 
believers to extremely painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true 
to their faith or else respectful of the law".
18
  In concluding his argument it is stated 
that the failure of the legislature to acknowledge and accommodate religious 
diversity, will not always survive constitutional scrutiny, since there is, according to 
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the Court, a 'right to be different'.  The word "values" is used once throughout the 
judment, and in my view, this judgment effectively engages with substantive 
reasoning by regarding values in a plural society.  
  
As a scholar of the Critical Legal Studies movement, he wishes to show that if legal 
consciousness – the belief in the inevitability of a status quo which favours some 
groups and some visions over others – can be changed, then society itself can be 
changed.  Law is politics. According to Sachs, the interpretation of the notion of 
reasonableness according to Western standards is inappropriate in a plural society 
such as South Africa.  
 
 
5 CONCLUSION  
  
Much is still to be said of 'subjective' and 'objective' reasons for decisions, as well as 
the wedge between 'legal reasoning' and 'moral and political reasoning', but from this 
brief assessment it is clear that it is inevitable for the Constitutional Court to engage 
in moral and political reasoning in order to fully embrace the substantive vision of law 
in matters pertaining to the interpretation to the Bill of Rights.  This will require the 
construction of a rationally defensible moral and political viewpoint, even though 
adjudicators will frequently be unable to escape making difficult value judgments, 
where logic and precedent are of limited assistance.
19
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16   Van Blerk  Jurisprudence An Introduction 18.  
17   In 'The judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty' (1971) 88 SALJ 181 at 199, Dugard called for the 
adoption of a 'realist-cum-natural-law approach' to the judicial process.  In Human Rights and the South 
African Legal Order (1978) 400 Dugard modified this in favour of a 'realist-cum-value-orientated approach'.  
18   Para 12.  
19   Coetzee v Government of RSA RJ  12.   
